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Abstract
Do physicians respond to financial incentives? We address this question by an-
alyzing the prescription behavior of physicians who are allowed to dispense drugs
themselves through onsite pharmacies. Using administrative data comprising over 16
million drug prescriptions between 2008 and 2012 in Upper Austria, a naïve com-
parison of raw figures reveals that self-dispensing GPs induce 33.2% higher drug
expenses than others. Our identification strategy rests on multiple pillars. First, we
use an extensive array of covariates along with multi-dimensional fixed effects which
account for patient and GP-level heterogeneity as well as sorting of GPs into onsite
pharmacies. Second, we use a novel approach that allows us to restrict our sam-
ple to randomly allocated patient-GP matches which rules out endogenous sorting
as well as principal-agent bargaining over prescriptions between patients and GPs.
Contrary to our descriptive analysis, we find evidence that onsite pharmacies have
a small negative effect on prescriptions. Although self-dispensing GPs seem to pre-
scribe slightly more expensive medication, this effect is absorbed by a much smaller
likelihood to prescribe in the first place, causing the overall effect to be negative.
Keywords: physician dispensing, drug expenses, physician agency, moral hazard
JEL classification: I11, I12
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Sazˇetak
Reagiraju li lijecˇnici na financijske poticaje? Odgovaramo na ovo pitanje anali-
zom propisivanja lijekova lijecˇnika kojima je dopušteno prodavati lijekove u sklopu
ljekarne u ordinaciji. Koristec´i administrativne podatke koji obuhvac´aju više od 16
milijuna medicinskih konzultacija izmed¯u 2008. i 2012. godine u Gornjoj Austriji,
obicˇna usporedba pokazuje da postojanje ljekarne u ordinaciji rezultira 33,2% vec´im
troškovima lijekova. U svrhu procjene kauzalnog efekta ljekarne u ordinaciji, koris-
timo identifikacijsku strategiju koja pocˇiva na sljedec´im temeljima: prvo, koristimo
širok skup kovarijata u kombinaciji s multidimenzionalnim fiksnim ucˇincima koji
kontroliraju heterogenost pacijenata i lijecˇnika, kao i sortiranje lijecˇnika u ordinacije
s ljekarnama. Drugo, koristimo novi pristup koji nam omoguc´uje da ogranicˇimo uzo-
rak na nasumicˇno spojene parove pacijent-lijecˇnik što iskljucˇuje endogeno sortiranje
pacijenata kao principala i lijecˇnika kao agenta. Za razliku od deskriptivne analize,
nalazimo da ljekarne u ordinaciji zapravo imaju negativan utjecaj na troškove lije-
kova. Iako lijecˇnici koji rade u ordinaciji s ljekarnom u prosjeku propisuju skuplje
lijekove, ukupni ucˇinak na troškove je negativan jer spomenuti lijecˇnici imaju mnogo
manju vjerojatnost propisivanja bilo kojeg lijeka.
Kljucˇne rijecˇi: propisivanje lijekova, troškovi lijecˇenja, moralni hazard
JEL klasifikacija: I11, I12
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I. Introduction 1
Ideally, physicians are perfect agents. They diagnose and provide treatments in a way
patients would if they had perfect information. In reality, however, we observe profound
variations in the provision of healthcare which cannot be explained by demand-side het-
erogeneities. Even after adjusting for prices and patient demographics, Gottlieb et al.
(2010), for example, document a $9,324 difference in per capita Medicare spending be-
tween Miami, FL and Salem, OR. In general, such regional variations may result either
from demand-side differences in patient health and preferences, from supply-side hetero-
geneities such as physicians’ education or preferences over treatments, or from geograph-
ical differences, for example, air pollution.
Most of the observed variation in healthcare utilization can be attributed to the first
channel. Using Austrian matched patient-general practitioner (GP) data, Ahammer and
Schober (2016), for example, show that patient needs and preferences explain well over
90% of the variation in primary care expenses.2 While the GP explains only a small
fraction (0.12%–4.36%) relative to the variation caused by patient-side heterogeneities
and stochastic health shocks, they find that the most lenient 10% of GPs induce roughly
25% higher expenses than the average GP, which is a sizable portion. With healthcare
expenditures rising across most countries, “policy-makers are under pressure to control
pharmaceutical expenditures without adversely affecting quality of care” (Rashidian et al.
2015), so understanding sources of these variations is crucial for policy making.
In this paper we focus on one specific source of variation; namely financial incentives.
Under specific conditions, physicians in Austria are allowed to dispense pharmaceuticals
themselves in the form of onsite pharmacies, which makes them entrepreneurs and agents
at the same time. Onsite pharmacies are permitted primarily for the purpose of ensuring
unhindered access to medical drugs in rural areas where regular pharmacies are often
difficult to reach. Operating an onsite pharmacy, however, allows physicians to earn a
mark-up on every drug they prescribe. In medical situations where no clinical guidelines
and consensus about treatments prevail, and where the marginal harm for the patient is
small, there is a clear incentive to induce demand.3
Put differently, GPs may exploit their informational advantage to prescribe medication
the patient’s health status may not necessarily require, for the sole purpose of maximizing
their own income. There is some causal evidence that doctors in fact do exhibit rent-
1Corresponding author: Alexander Ahammer, Department of Economics, Johannes Ke-
pler University Linz, Altenberger Strasse 69, 4040 Linz, ph. +43(0)732/2468-7372, e-mail:
alexander.ahammer@jku.at. We thank Gerald Pruckner, Tom Schober, Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, and sem-
inar participants at the econ@JKU workshop in Schlierbach for numerous helpful discussions and valuable
comments. Eorda Sinollari provided excellent research assistance. This work has been supported by Chris-
tian Doppler Laboratory “Aging, Health, and the Labor Market” and TVOJ GRANT@EIZ.
2Ahammer and Schober (2016) perform variance decompositions based on components of hierarchical
fixed effects models which contain patient-specific time-varying observables as well as both patient-level
and GP-level fixed effects. Finkelstein et al. (2016) apply a similar methodology to U.S. data with geo-
graphical area as the second hierarchical level instead of GPs. They find that region-specific effects account
for 54% of the total variation in Medicare utilization, while 47% can be explained by the patient.
3Medical situations in which clinical guidance is scarce, and the GP’s benefits of supply-inducing are
idiosyncratic to the patient, are coined “gray area of medicine” by Chandra, Cutler, and Song (2012).
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seeking behavior (e.g., Melichar 2009 or Clemens and Gottlieb 2014, see section I.1),
hence we hypothesize that having an onsite pharmacy leads, ceteris paribus, to an increase
in drug expenses. In order to verify this conjecture, we use administrative data from the
Upper Austrian Sickness Fund (UASF) which covers around 75% of the population in
Upper Austria, one of nine provinces in Austria with roughly 1.4 million inhabitants as
of 2016. We have access to a total of 23,820,854 observations representing the universe
of GP consultations for these insurees. Contrary to our unconditional descriptive analysis
which reveals that self-dispensing GPs induce on average 33.2% higher per patient drug
expenses than others, first regressions reveal that doctors who run onsite pharmacies are
in fact slightly less likely to prescribe medication in the first place, and induce roughly
e 2.1 ($2.25 or 5.9%) lower drug expenses than their non-dispensing colleagues.
This is a surprising result, since the existing literature (Burkhard et al. 2015, Kaiser
and Schmid 2016) in fact finds large positive effects of dispensing on drug prescriptions.
Although our regressions so far control for physician ability and patient health status in
a rigorous way, and sorting of GPs into pharmacies can be conditioned on GP-level fixed
effects, there are two other mechanisms we have to worry about: first, through a series of
consultations, patients and GPs may develop a principal-agent relationship which allows
the patient to bargain over drug prescriptions. In this case, the onsite pharmacy coefficient
may reflect the patient’s prescription decision rather than the GP’s, which is not what we
want to measure. Second, patients may systematically avoid GPs who operate onsite
pharmacies. If this type of endogenous sorting drives our results, we expect the pharmacy
coefficient to be biased towards zero.
To avoid these issues, we suggest a novel identification approach which relies on a
sample of randomly allocated patient-GP matches. In particular, we restrict our sample
to drugs prescribed on weekends and public holidays. On weekends and public holidays,
GPs in Austria rotate to provide out-of-hours services for the purpose of ensuring basic
healthcare, which is especially important in rural areas where no hospital is in close prox-
imity. If a patient decides to consult a physician outside opening hours, assignment can
thus be considered random, because it depends only on the community’s rotation sched-
ule.4 Using this strategy to account for endogenous sorting, our estimates become even
larger in magnitude and retain their statistical significance. We interpret this as a sign of
defensive medicine (Chandra et al. 2012, Lucas et al. 2010): ceteris paribus, GPs seem
more reluctant to induce demand if they are not acquainted with the patient.
Overall, we find evidence that GPs who operate onsite pharmacies may not necessar-
ily induce higher drug expenses than others. Although estimates suggest that GPs with
onsite pharmacies prescribe slightly more expensive medication (but only if the GP is not
acquainted with the patient, i.e., the patient-GP match is random), this effect is absorbed
by a much smaller likelihood to prescribe something in the first place, causing the over-
all effect to be negative. This is not surprising: for our sample of UASF patients, we
4To our knowledge, there is only one paper using a similar approach: Ahammer (2016) estimates labor
market effects of supply-induced sick leaves. As a robustness check, he restricts his sample to sick leaves
starting on weekends and public holidays as well. Since he does not observe the actual date of certification,
however, Ahammer has to assume that it coincides with the start of the sick leave. If they are systematically
different, the allocation mechanism cannot be considered random anymore. In this paper, we decided to
focus solely on drug prescriptions, since for those we know the exact date of consultation.
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find that self-dispensing GPs earn on average an additional e 109,882.5 ($118,328.65)
in revenues per year, for doing the same work as non-dispensing GPs. Thus, the finan-
cial incentive to supply-induce may not be as strong as initially thought, and dispensing
GPs may even prescribe more defensively due to the additional income. However, why
does the existing literature find evidence for supply-inducement then? First, Kaiser and
Schmid (2016) and Burkhard et al. (2015) may not sufficiently take into account sorting
of GPs into onsite pharmacies, which would upward bias their estimated effect on drug
expenses. Second, both studies use Swiss data where in certain cantons, all physicians are
allowed to dispense drugs. In our setup, only country doctors are permitted to have onsite
pharmacies. In rural areas, however, competition between GPs is low, and competition
has been shown to be associated with more aggressive prescription behavior (Ahammer
and Schober 2016, Léonard et al. 2009, Scott and Shiell 1997). Lastly, onsite pharmacies
typically have a smaller variety of drugs than regular pharmacies (Pruckner and Schober
2016). For pharmaceuticals they do not have in stock, incentives to overprescribe are the
same as for other GPs, which also contributes to zero effect.
I.1. Related literature and our contributions
Our paper generally belongs to the broad literature on practice styles and supply-induced
demand (see, e.g., McGuire and Pauly 1991 and Chandra et al. 2012 for overviews).
In particular, we contribute to the literature on the role of financial incentives in medi-
cal care. A recent example providing causal evidence is Clemens and Gottlieb (2014),
who use price shocks triggered by regional Medicare consolidations in 1997 to estimate
care elasticities with respect to reimbursement rates. They find that healthcare supplied
to Medicare patients increases overproportionally with the reimbursement rate. Another
notable example is Melichar (2009), who exploits within-physician variation in reim-
bursement schemes involving different financial incentives for marginal increases in the
provision of healthcare. She finds that GPs spend less time with patients they receive
no marginal revenues for, as compared to patients whose expenses are reimbursed on a
fee-for-service basis. There is also experimental evidence from the field: Kouides et al.
(1998), for example, document that physicians randomly selected to receive a monetary
benefit for increasing their influenza immunization rate eventually achieved a 6.9 percent-
age points higher rate than physicians in the control group.
Related is also the literature on the role of onsite pharmacies in the choice of generic
versus brand-name drugs in day-to-day medical care. In systems where physicians are
allowed to prescribe and dispense drugs at the same time, Liu et al. (2009), Iizuka (2007,
2016), and Rischatsch et al. (2013) find that profit incentives significantly affect physician
prescription behavior. Analyzing the interrelations between inpatient and outpatient pre-
scription behavior, Pruckner and Schober (2016) find that GPs are less likely to adhere to
the hospital’s treatment choice if they dispense drugs themselves.
There is much less literature on the actual effect of physician self-dispensing on drug
expenses. To our knowledge, there are currently only two studies which specifically
consider that question: Kaiser and Schmid (2016) exploit geographical variation in dis-
pensing regulations across Switzerland. They empirically match physicians from cantons
where it is permitted to operate onsite pharmacies to physicians from cantons where it
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is prohibited. Using doubly robust estimation, Kaiser and Schmid find that physician
dispensing increases medical drug expenditures by roughly 34% per patient.
Burkhard et al. (2015) replicate their analysis but decompose the estimated increase in
expenditures into a price and a volume effect. They show that the volume effect is domi-
nant, while the price effect is small and insignificantly different from zero. However, both
papers implicitly assume that GPs sort exogenously into cantons where self-dispensing is
permitted, and that patients are matched randomly to GPs, conditional on their explana-
tory variables. Although they use a very rich set of control variables, sorting based on
unobservables cannot be fully ruled out.
We contribute to the literature in several important ways. First, we specifically take
into account sorting of GPs into onsite pharmacies and endogenous matching between
patients and GPs, the latter by employing a novel identification strategy allowing to draw
a sample of randomly matched patient-GP pairs. Second, we introduce fixed effects es-
timation along with a rich set of covariates including a physician ability proxy based on
adjusted mortality rates. Third, since we do not aggregate our data on the physician level,
we can analyze the onsite pharmacy effect both on the extensive and on the intensive mar-
gin. Fourth, we are the first to analyze effect heterogeneities based on age, education,
gender, and wages.
II. Institutional setting
Austria has a Bismarckian welfare system where virtually all residents have universal
access to healthcare. Mandatory health insurance covers all medical expenses both in
the inpatient and outpatient sector, including prescription medicines.5 The Federation of
Austrian Social Security Institutions, an umbrella organization encompassing all 22 in-
dividual health insurance funds,6 maintains a positive list of permitted pharmaceuticals,
the so-called Reimbursement Codex. In 2010, the codex contained 4,200 different medi-
cations which patients have access to upon prescription by a physician and payment of a
small prescription fee in the dispensing pharmacy.7
With 5 doctors per 1,000 inhabitants in 2013, Austria has the highest physician density
among all OECD countries (OECD 2015). Outpatient care is mainly provided by around
19,000 independently practicing physicians of whom 56% are contracted with one or
several health insurance funds. These contracted physicians (both GPs and specialists) can
5According to Hofmarcher (2013), Austrian health policy follows the principle of ensuring equal access
to health care for all, irrespective of demographic and socioeconomic preconditions. She states that, de
facto, the health system comes very close to achieving this goal. Almost 99.9% of the population in 2011
was covered by health insurance, the quality of care is generally considered to be high, and most treatments
and services are universally accessible. However, this comes at the expense of very high cost. Both in
absolute terms and in percent of GDP, Austria ranks well above the EU-15 average in terms of health care
expenditures (OECD 2015).
6Note that affiliation to one of these 22 health insurance funds may not be chosen freely but depends on
occupation and place of residence of the patient. Thus there is no endogenous sorting and no competition
among health insurances.
7In 2012, the prescription fee was e 5.15 or $5.51 (Hofmarcher 2013). Pharmacies are reimbursed by
the patient’s health insurance for the prescribed drug’s cost, which the fee is offset against.
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be accessed free of charge and without a referral; non-contracted physicians, on the other
hand, charge a fee which will partly be reimbursed by the patient’s insurance. Patients
are not obliged to consult their GP before seeking specialist or inpatient treatment, thus
general practitioners formally do not serve a gatekeeping function in Austria. Although it
is still common to have a family doctor, patients may also switch GPs on a regular basis.
For general practitioners, it is typically preferable to secure a contract with at least
one health insurance fund, as it guarantees a constant influx of patients and has several
bureaucratic advantages (ÖKZ 2007). Contracted positions, however, are limited. Both
the geographical distribution as well as the absolute number of contracted physicians are
regulated by the Federation of Austrian Social Security Institutions. Medical profession-
als that strive for a GP position thus have to pass through an application procedure where
candidates are selected based on professional aptitude. Only contracted physicians are
allowed to maintain onsite pharmacies.
II.1. Country doctors and onsite pharmacies
In a country where almost half of the population lives in predominantly rural regions
(Eurostat 2013), an important pillar of outpatient medical care are country doctors (in
German called “Landarzte”). Officially, a country doctor is a contracted physician who
either practices in a community with up to 3,000 inhabitants, or is one of at most two con-
tracted physicians in a single community (Austrian Medical Chamber 2013). According
to the medical chamber, roughly 40 percent of general practitioners in Austria fall within
this category. In 2013, this amounted to 1,563 doctors being responsible for over 43% of
the population.
More than half of these doctors, however, are expected to retire within the next ten
years. This poses an important challenge for officials and policy makers, who have long
been lamenting about the lack of young doctors applying for vacant insurance contracts in
rural areas (Austrian Medical Chamber 2013). Often living and working conditions dis-
courage physicians to settle in these areas, thus the average number of applicants per coun-
try doctor vacancy in Upper Austria decreased from 5 in 2001 to 1.2 in 2012. Amongst
other measures, onsite pharmacies are increasingly instrumentalized by policy makers to
attract physicians and counteract the expected shortage of doctors in rural areas (Austrian
Medical Chamber 2013).
Onsite pharmacies require physicians to act as entrepreneurs. Typically they purchase
a selection of common medications from pharmaceutical wholesalers which they dispense
directly to the patient upon issuing a prescription. Since prices are fixed through the
insurance’s reimbursement rate, onsite pharmacies cannot compete on prices with regular
pharmacies. A country doctor is permitted to operate an onsite pharmacy if (1) she is
contracted with at least one health insurance fund, (2) there is no regular pharmacy in her
community, and (3) the next regular pharmacy is more than six kilometers away. In 2016,
the government passed a law which allows GPs to keep their onsite pharmacy even when
a regular pharmacy opens within their community, as long as the pharmacy is more than
four kilometers away. If a pharmacy opens within a radius of four kilometers around the
physician’s practice, operating an onsite pharmacy is no longer permitted.
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II.2. Weekend prescriptions
General practitioners in Upper Austria typically work Monday to Friday. On weekends
and public holidays, each community has a rotation schedule of GPs providing out-of-
hours services in order to ensure the provision of basic health care. This institution is
especially important in rural areas, where the nearest hospital is difficult to reach. In
some communities, the rotation schedule is posted on a website or in local newspapers,
in others, patients have to call the emergency service (typically the Red Cross) where the
dispatcher informs them about the GP on duty. If a patient decides to consult a GP on a
weekend or public holiday, assignment is therefore random since it depends solely on the
community’s rotation schedule.
As discussed in section IV, our main estimations are based on a sample restricted
to prescriptions filed on weekends or public holidays. Indeed, this sample may also be
selected if (1) patients postpone their consultation until after the weekend because their
medical condition does not require urgent treatment, or (2) they choose to go to a hospital
instead. As long as patients do not base their decision on whether the GP on duty has
an onsite pharmacy, neither of these selection mechanisms biases our results. In order to
avoid learning effects, we use only the first match between patient and GP, so typically
the patient will not have much information about the doctor.
III. Data
The main source of data for our empirical analysis is the Upper Austrian Sickness Fund
(UASF), which gathers detailed information on health care utilization in both the inpatient
and outpatient sector for roughly one million insurees. As described in section II, these
insurees correspond to about three quarters of the Upper Austrian population, composed
of private as well as public sector workers, retirees, and unemployed people. We augment
the data with information on patient education and wages from the Austrian Social Secu-
rity Database (Zweimüller et al. 2009) as well as additional demographic information on
physicians from the Upper Austrian Medical Chamber.
For our analysis we draw a sample comprising the universe of medical drug pre-
scriptions issued by general practitioners between 2008 and 2012.8 In total, we observe
16,341,428 prescriptions issued by 632 GPs to 1,135,893 patients — on average, this
amounts to roughly 14 prescriptions per patient over the entire period. Additionally, we
add all available consultations that did not result in a drug prescription to our data, which
allows us to analyze the effect of financial incentives at the extensive margin, i.e., the
overall probability of receiving medication when a GP is consulted. Our primary cri-
terion for including a prescription is whether it is issued by a general practitioner. For
self-dispensing GPs, we also include drugs that are dispensed at a regular pharmacy (i.e.,
not sold at the onsite pharmacy).9 In total, this leaves us with a sample of 23,820,854
8Unfortunately, our data does not allow us to analyze outcomes other than medical drug prescriptions,
since we do not have an exact date of consultation (which we need to define our weekend sample) for
non-drug health services. Kaiser and Schmid (2016) find that drug and non-drug expenditures are comple-
mentary goods for self-dispensing physicians.
9This could, for example, be the case for certain uncommon medications (such as cancer drugs) the GP
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consultations.
Our main regressions are based on a subset of these data, namely drug prescriptions is-
sued on weekends or public holidays (for convenience we call this the “weekend sample”
henceforth). If a patient visited the same GP multiple times on weekends or holidays, we
keep only the first consultation in order to avoid learning effects. For reasons discussed
in section IV.2, we are primarily interested in weekend and public holiday prescriptions
because they provide more reliable estimates than the full sample. Thus, we do not in-
clude drug prescriptions by specialists, since they typically do not provide out-of-hours
services on weekends.
Summary statistics are provided in Table 1, where we provide first and second mo-
ments of our most important variables for the full sample, the weekend subsample, and
a sample of “changers”. The latter is simply a subset of the full sample comprising the
largest connected set of consultations filed by GPs who opened or closed an onsite phar-
macy at least once during our observation period. Because we include GP fixed effects in
our estimations, these are in fact the observations which ultimately identify our results.
Note that the means of the changer sample are remarkably similar to those obtained from
the full sample, thus fixed effects estimates should be representative as well.
Our four outcome variables are discussed extensively in section IV. At the exten-
sive margin, we estimate the effect of onsite pharmacies on a binary variable indicating
whether at least one unit of medication is prescribed during the consultation (i.e., drug
expenses are positive), and overall drug expenses of the consultation, including also zeros
for consultations where no drug was prescribed. At the intensive margin, we look at drug
expenses per unit and at the number of units prescribed, both conditional on receiving at
least one unit of medication. On weekends and public holidays, in general it seems that
slightly less medication is prescribed.
Our treatment indicator is a binary variable indicating whether the consulted GP op-
erates an onsite pharmacy, and zero otherwise. Around 30% of all GPs operate an onsite
pharmacy; this corresponds roughly to the official numbers cited in section II.1. In the
weekend sample, the fraction of GPs with onsite pharmacies is higher, which makes sense
given that weekend consultations are used more by people living in rural areas, where also
onsite pharmacies are much more common than in densely populated areas. For the GP,
we also have information on gender and age: it seems that GPs in Upper Austria are pre-
dominantly men aged 50 or older. Again, these numbers coincide with the official figures
presented in section II.1.
At the patient level, we control for age, wages, and health proxies — these are time-
varying variables, and their means reflect mostly what we expect a priori. Additionally,
we have information on gender, education, and migratory status. Overall, patients are
more likely to be male, around 50% are between 50 and 80 years of age, and their high-
est educational degree is most likely apprenticeship training. Health proxies are the sum
of drug expenses in the year prior to the consultation (“medication history”) and the ag-
gregate number of days spent in hospital the year prior to the consultation (“hospital his-
may not have in stock at her onsite pharmacy. In general, we expect onsite pharmacies to have a smaller
variety of medications than regular pharmacies, which is also a result in Pruckner and Schober (2016).
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Table 1 — Descriptive statistics.
Full sample Weekend samplea Diff.b Changers
c
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Outcomes
Positive expenses 0.686 0.464 0.541 0.498 0.145 0.688 0.463
Total expenses (in EUR) 35.642 147.779 24.191 156.145 11.451 35.963 201.439
Units of medication 2.010 3.899 1.362 3.046 0.648 1.967 3.804
GP characteristics
Onsite pharmacy 0.299 0.458 0.347 0.476 −0.048 0.746 0.435
Female 0.122 0.327 0.111 0.314 0.011 0.539 0.498
Age
Under 35 0.002 0.039 0.001 0.035 0.0003 0 0
35 to 40 0.010 0.102 0.009 0.094 0.001 0.079 0.270
40 to 45 0.041 0.197 0.032 0.176 0.009 0.243 0.429
45 to 50 0.107 0.309 0.088 0.283 0.019 0.311 0.463
50 to 55 0.256 0.436 0.233 0.423 0.023 0.212 0.409
55 to 60 0.342 0.474 0.360 0.480 −0.018 0.138 0.345
60 to 65 0.201 0.401 0.227 0.419 −0.026 0.017 0.128
Over 65 0.042 0.200 0.051 0.219 −0.009 0 0
Adjusted mortality 1.000 0.003 1.000 0.003 0.0001 1.000 0.003
Patient characteristics
Female 0.564 0.496 0.536 0.499 0.029 0.571 0.495
Age
Under 20 0.098 0.297 0.141 0.348 −0.043 0.119 0.324
20 to 30 0.076 0.265 0.099 0.299 −0.024 0.076 0.265
30 to 40 0.087 0.281 0.109 0.312 −0.023 0.088 0.284
40 to 50 0.130 0.336 0.155 0.362 −0.026 0.127 0.333
50 to 60 0.159 0.366 0.167 0.373 −0.008 0.155 0.362
60 to 70 0.183 0.387 0.144 0.351 0.039 0.177 0.382
70 to 80 0.162 0.368 0.116 0.320 0.046 0.167 0.373
Over 80 0.106 0.308 0.069 0.253 0.038 0.091 0.287
Education
Compulsory 0.063 0.243 0.073 0.260 −0.010 0.061 0.240
Apprenticeship 0.156 0.363 0.198 0.399 −0.042 0.162 0.368
High school 0.117 0.322 0.152 0.359 −0.034 0.118 0.323
University 0.034 0.182 0.040 0.196 −0.006 0.030 0.170
Missing 0.629 0.483 0.537 0.499 0.092 0.629 0.483
Daily wage (in EUR) 27.872 43.745 36.373 46.925 −8.501 27.393 42.628
Migrant 0.166 0.372 0.160 0.366 0.006 0.168 0.374
Medication historyd 159.829 494.278 122.481 448.909 37.349 154.987 457.232
Hospital historye 0.599 3.812 0.463 3.303 0.136 0.562 3.599
ATC medication code
Missing 0.033 0.178 0.039 0.194 −0.006 0.025 0.155
Alimentary tract and metabolism 0.108 0.310 0.079 0.270 0.029 0.115 0.319
Blood and blood forming organs 0.015 0.122 0.010 0.101 0.005 0.016 0.125
Cardiovascular system 0.199 0.399 0.136 0.342 0.063 0.206 0.405
Dermatologicals 0.015 0.120 0.012 0.111 0.002 0.014 0.116
Genito-urinary system 0.016 0.124 0.010 0.102 0.005 0.017 0.129
Systemic hormonal preparations 0.018 0.131 0.014 0.119 0.003 0.018 0.132
Antiinfectives for systemic use 0.059 0.236 0.067 0.250 −0.008 0.066 0.249
Antineoplastic and imm. agents 0.006 0.078 0.005 0.069 0.001 0.007 0.083
Musculo-skeletal system 0.065 0.247 0.051 0.220 0.014 0.066 0.248
Nervous system 0.102 0.302 0.073 0.261 0.028 0.088 0.283
Antiparasitic products 0.0004 0.020 0.0003 0.018 0.0001 0.0004 0.021
Respiratory system 0.044 0.205 0.038 0.190 0.006 0.041 0.198
Sensory organs 0.006 0.079 0.005 0.070 0.001 0.008 0.089
Various 0.001 0.028 0.001 0.026 0.0001 0.001 0.035
Sample size 23,820,854 2,089,438 — 484,415
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for our sample of consultations.
a Sample is restricted to medications prescribed on weekends or public holidays.
b Difference in means between the full sample and the weekend sample.
c Sample of patients receiving medication from GPs that changed their onsite pharmacy status at least once between 2008 and 2012.
d Medication history is the aggregate amount of drug expenses one year prior to the consultation.
e Hospital history is the aggregate number of days spent in hospital one year prior to the consultation.
10
tory”). On top of that, we include a full set of region-specific controls in our estimations.10
These are especially important because we want to pick up as much location-specific het-
erogeneity as possible.
Finally, we use the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classification system to
control for the type of medication prescribed. Unfortunately, we do not have information
on diagnoses, thus the ATC code serves as a proxy for the medical condition the patient
suffers from. Around 40% of all drugs prescribed fall within one of these categories:
alimentary tract and metabolism (e.g., laxatives, antidiarrhoeals, antidiabetics, vitamins,
or dietary minerals), cardiovascular system (e.g., beta blockers, cardiac stimulants, or
antiarrhythmics), or nervous system (e.g., analgesics, antidepressants, anti-ADHD agents,
etc.), with cardiac therapy drugs being the most common.
IV. Methodology
We estimate the following fixed effects model:
yijt = ϑ · 1{ospijt} + Xijtβ′ + Witγ′ + Z jtδ′ + Miϕ′ + η j + τt + εijt (1)
where yijt is medical care received by individual i = 1, . . . ,N provided by GP j = 1, . . . , J
at time t = 1, . . . ,Ti, thus subscript ijt uniquely identifies a consultation. The treatment
indicator 1{ospijt} ∈ {0, 1} equals unity if GP j providing medical care to individual i
maintains an onsite pharmacy at time t, and zero otherwise — our main coefficient of
interest is therefore ϑ.
Additionally, the vector Xijt contains consultation-specific control variables such as
the first letter of the prescribed drug’s ATC classification system code, the vector Wit
comprises time-variant patient-level controls such as age, wage, and a full set of commu-
nity fixed effects, Z jt captures time-variant GP-level control variables such as age and a
measure of physician ability (adjusted GP-specific mortality rates, see section IV.2 for a
detailed description), and Mi contains patient-level time-invariant control variables (e.g.,
gender, migratory status, and education). Finally, we include a full set of GP-level fixed
effects η j as well as year and month fixed effects τt.
IV.1. Outcome variables
Let expijt be the sum of prices of all drugs prescribed in consultation ijt in euros, and let
volijt be the number of units of drugs prescribed (typically packages). Then, our vector of
outcome variables yijt consists of
(1) “positive expenses” 1{expijt > 0} ∈ {0, 1}, an indicator variable which equals unity
when patient i receives some medication from GP j during the consultation at time
t, and zero if the patient does not receive any medication,
10We build geographical clusters based on the first three out of four figures of the patient’s zip code —
these correspond roughly to larger communities.
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(2) “total expenses” log(1 + expijt), a continuous measure for the sum of the prices of
all drugs prescribed during consultation ijt,
(3) “expenses per unit” log[1 + (expijt/volijt)], a continuous measure of drug expenses
per unit prescribed during consultation ijt, conditional on 1{expijt > 0} = 1, and
(4) “medication volume” volijt, a discrete measure of the number of units prescribed
during consultation ijt, conditional on 1{expijt > 0} = 1,
where (1) can be interpreted as the extensive margin (i.e., the probability of receiving a
drug in the first place), whereas (3) and (4) can be interpreted as the intensive margin
(i.e., the price and volume effect conditional on receiving medication). Outcome (2) is
also located at the extensive margin since it includes zeros as well (when no medication
is prescribed).
Since most of our outcome variables are non-binary, we decide to model yijt as a lin-
ear additive function of the treatment indicator 1{ospijt} and the set of control variables
(Xijt,Wit,Z jt,Mi, η j, τt). The coefficient of interest ϑ can then be interpreted as the dif-
ference in outcomes between self-dispensing and non-self-dispensing GPs. Because we
include GP fixed effects η j, we require ospijt to be time-variant for ϑ to be estimable.
Thus, identification comes from GPs that opened or closed their onsite pharmacies during
the observation period. As discussed in section II, the latter may, for example, be possible
whenever a GP is not allowed to dispense drugs anymore because a regular pharmacy has
opened within a distance of four kilometers from her practice. In Table 1, we provide
summary statistics for consultations of GPs changing their dispensing status; it turns out
that their averages are remarkably close to those found for the full sample.
IV.2. Identification
In order to discuss identification of our main parameter ϑ, we use the potential outcomes
framework (Rubin 1974). Consider again the model in equation (1). To simplify notation,
define dk ≡ dk(ijt) ≡ 1{ospijt}, with k(ijt) denoting consultation k of GP j to patient i at
time t. Let y1k be the potential outcome if physician j owns an onsite pharmacy at time
t (i.e., if dk = 1), and let y0k be the potential outcome if the physician does not dispense
drugs herself (dk = 0). Furthermore, let Vk denote the set of control variables in model
(IV), Vk = (Xijt,Wit,Z jt,Mi, η j, τt). Then, the conditional average treatment effect (ATE)
we are ultimately interested in can be written as
ϑ = E[y1k − y0k |Vk]. (2)
For ϑ in (2) to be identified, we require the treatment status dk to be as good as ran-
domly assigned, conditional on our set of covariates Vk. Formally,
{y1k, y0k} |= dk |Vk, (3)
where |= denotes statistical independence. If the conditional independence assumption in
(3) holds, the difference in conditional average outcomes has a causal interpretation. That
is,
E[y1k − y0k |Vk] = E[yk |Vk, dk = 1] − E[yk |Vk, dk = 0]. (4)
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Due to the extensive array of control variables, we are confident that most systematic
differences in patients and GPs which may be correlated with dk are accounted for in our
regressions. However, there are two main threats to identification which we will discuss
in more detail here, both related to self-selection. First, GPs may self-select into onsite
pharmacies. Our main remedy to deal with that issue is to include GP fixed effects in
model (1), arguing that the unobserved propensity to self-select into dispensing is likely
a time-invariant personality trait, or at least a characteristic that does not change over
time. Additionally, we follow Biørn and Godager (2010) and Markussen et al. (2012)
and construct adjusted mortality rates as a proxy for physician ability, which is likely also
a determinant of self-selection into dispensing and potentially time-variant (e.g., through
further education). We proceed as follows: first, define a family doctor j for every patient i
in the UASF data, and build a yearly panel for i = 1, . . . ,N and t = 1, . . . ,T . Second,
perform the following regression:
Pr[1{deadit} = 1] = pi1 · ageit + pi2 · 1{ f emalei} + Citψ′ + ξit (5)
where 1{deadit} ∈ {0, 1} is a binary variable indicating whether patient i died in year t and
Cit is a vector of community dummies. Third, average the predicted values obtained from
estimating model (5) via OLS over all patients of GP j: Let Pj be the set of patients of
GP j, and let Pj be the cardinality of Pj, then
Λ j =
1
PjT
Pj∑
i=1 | i∈Pj
T∑
t=1
̂Pr[1{deadit}] (6)
is the adjusted mortality rate for GP j.
Controlling for physician ability along with age and GP-level fixed effects, we believe
that most unobserved factors determining endogenous sorting of GPs into self-dispensing
are accounted for in our model. A different sorting mechanism, however, may also im-
pede identification, namely endogenous matching of patients to certain GPs. Again, we
suppose that most factors driving these sorting decisions are already controlled for in our
regressions (most importantly physician ability) — however, our results may still be bi-
ased if there are unobserved determinants we do not catch. Therefore, we restrict our
sample to consultations on weekends and public holidays.
On weekends and public holidays, GP practices in Upper Austria are typically closed.
As discussed in section II.2, however, each community has a schedule of GPs rotating to
provide out-of-hours services in order to ensure medical care in emergency cases. Since
patients do not know which GP is on duty if they get sick on a weekend, the allocation
between patient and GP is as good as random. In section II.2, we briefly discuss two cases
where this sample may still be selected on unobservables: (1) if the patient postpones her
visit until after the weekend, and (2) if the patient decides to go to a hospital instead.
As long as the patient does not base her decision on whether the GP on duty operates an
onsite pharmacy, these cases will not affect identification in our framework.11 Since the
patient does not have any information about the GP on duty (which we ensure by keeping
11Note that, even if the patient considers the dispensing status of the matched GP when deciding whether
to consult the GP, postpone her visit or go to a hospital, our estimates would be lower bounds of the actual
effect.
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Table 2 — Average per patient per year drug expenses for GPs with and without onsite pharmacies.
Onsite pharmacy
No Yes Difference
(1) (2) (3)
Non-adjusted drug expenses (in EUR) 50.75 67.62 33.2%
Adjusted drug expenses (in EUR) 16.57 18.65 12.6%
Notes: This table gives the difference in average per patient per year drug ex-
penses of GPs who do not maintain an onsite pharmacy (“No”) and those who
do (“Yes”). The adjusted difference is based on residuals from regressing drug
expenses on a third-order polynomial in age and a female dummy.
only the first patient-GP match if there are multiple), we believe that this is a plausible
assumption.
Another appealing feature of using only weekend prescriptions is that it eliminates cer-
tain principal-agent dynamics which may have evolved between patient and GP. Through
a series of consultations, patients may develop a relationship with their GPs which al-
lows them to bargain over drug prescriptions. Because we only use random patient-GP
matches, such dynamics do not distort identification either. In section V, we report re-
sults both for the full sample as well as for the weekend sample since comparing these
estimates may provide insight about the effects of patient and GP self-selection on drug
prescriptions. Generally, we expect estimated onsite pharmacy effects to be upwards bi-
ased if there is endogenous sorting of GPs into onsite pharmacies, and to be downwards
biased if patients systematically avoid GPs with onsite pharmacies.
V. Results
In Table 2, we present average yearly per patient drug expenses, both for GPs operat-
ing an onsite pharmacy and for those who do not dispense drugs themselves. For non-
dispensing GPs, non-adjusted drug expenses are based on prescriptions issued by the GP
and dispensed at a regular pharmacy. For self-dispensing GPs, in contrast, we consider
only prescriptions that are dispensed directly at the onsite pharmacy, disregarding drugs
which are dispensed at a regular pharmacy.12
Average drug expenses of self-dispensing GPs are e 16.87 ($18.17) or 33.2% higher
than the drug expenses induced by other GPs. Since we only consider drugs dispensed
and billed directly by the GP, e 67.62 ($72.82) can be interpreted as the average yearly
revenue generated through the onsite pharmacy. Self-dispensing GPs have on average
1,625 patients; their total average revenue per year is thus e 109,882.5 ($118,328.63),
which they earn on top of reimbursements paid by the health insurance for other medical
12As discussed in section III, our data also comprises drugs prescribed by a self-dispensing GP but
dispensed by a regular pharmacy instead of the GP herself. The reason is that we are interested in how
financial incentives affect prescription behavior overall, irrespective of whether the GP in fact sells the drug
herself in the end or issues a prescription for a regular pharmacy.
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Table 3 — Estimation results for full sample.
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Positive Total Expenses Medication
expenses expenses per unit volume
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Onsite pharmacy −0.022∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗ 0.011 0.014
(0.008) (0.028) (0.009) (0.021)
Patient is female 0.013∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.070∗∗∗ 0.014
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.010)
Patient drug historya 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.00001) (0.0001) (0.00002) (0.0001)
Patient hospital historyb 0.002∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.002)
Patient wage −0.017∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005)
Patient is migrant 0.023∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ 0.009
(0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.011)
GP adjusted mortality 0.206∗ 0.665∗ −0.141 2.332∗∗
(0.114) (0.383) (0.154) (1.115)
GP fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year and month Yes Yes Yes Yes
ATC codes — — Yes Yes
Patient education and age Yes Yes Yes Yes
GP age Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23,820,854 23,820,854 16,341,428 16,341,428
Adjusted R2 0.188 0.236 0.176 0.072
Notes: In this table we present results from estimating equation (1) on the full sample of general practitioner
consultations. Every column represents an individual regression estimated by OLS: in column (1), the
outcome is 1{expijt > 0}; in column (2), the outcome is log(1 + expijt); in column (3), the outcome is
log[1 + (expijt/volijt)]; and in column (4), the outcome is volijt. Heteroskedasticity-robust and community-
level clustered standard errors are given in parentheses below coefficients; stars indicate significance levels:
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
a Medication history is the aggregate amount of drug expenses one year prior to the consultation.
b Hospital history is the aggregate number of days spent in hospital one year prior to the consultation.
services. The main purpose of this paper is to verify how much of this difference can be
ascribed to the possibility of self-dispensing, and how much is caused by other factors
such as patient health or endogenous sorting.
In Table 3, we take a closer look at the determinants of individual drug prescriptions.
Before we turn to our main analysis based on a sample of randomly allocated patient-GP
matches, we run our estimations on the universe of drug prescriptions in order to gain
a more comprehensive picture. For a detailed discussion of our four outcome variables
we refer the reader to section IV.1 — in general, columns (1) and (2) should capture
effects at the extensive margin (i.e., the overall probability of receiving medication), while
columns (3) and (4) consider the intensive margin (i.e., given that the patient receives
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Table 4 — Estimation results for sample of weekend and public holiday prescriptions, extensive
margin.
Positive expenses Total expenses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Onsite pharmacy −0.128∗∗∗ −0.125∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗∗ −0.419∗∗ −0.391∗∗ −0.389∗∗
(0.049) (0.046) (0.045) (0.192) (0.175) (0.175)
Patient is female 0.023∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.009∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
Patient drug historya 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Patient hospital historya 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.001)
Patient wage −0.020∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Patient is migrant 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗ −0.004 −0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.010)
GP adjusted mortality 0.309 −0.937
(0.642) (2.022)
GP fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year and month Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ATC codes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Patient education and age Yes Yes Yes Yes
GP age Yes Yes
Community fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 2,089,438 2,089,438 2,089,438 1,130,723 1,130,723 1,130,723
Adjusted R2 0.348 0.395 0.396 0.138 0.228 0.229
Notes: In this table we present results from estimating equation (1) on the sample of weekend and public
holiday GP consultations. Every column represents an individual regression estimated by OLS: in columns
(1), (2), and (3), the outcome is 1{expijt > 0}; in columns (4), (5), and (6), the outcome is log(1 + expijt).
Heteroskedasticity-robust and community-level clustered standard errors are given in parentheses below
coefficients; stars indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
a Medication history is the aggregate amount of drug expenses one year prior to the consultation.
b Hospital history is the aggregate number of days spent in hospital one year prior to the consultation.
medication, what determines its expenses and volume). Inference is based on analytical
heteroskedasticity-robust and community-level clustered standard errors.
In column (1) we consider the overall probability of receiving medication as an out-
come. In contrast to our descriptive analysis, we find that consulting a GP who has an
onsite pharmacy in fact decreases the likelihood of receiving medication by 2.2 percent-
age points, which corresponds to 3.3% of the sample mean. In column (2), we find a
similar effect: overall expenses decrease by 5.9% — in terms of the sample mean, this
corresponds to a reduction from e 35.64 ($38.38) to e 33.54 ($36.12). Thus, we find
rather small yet statistically significant effects at the extensive margin.
Columns (3) and (4) are only observed conditional on receiving at least one unit of
medication. For both expenses per unit and the number of units, we find small positive
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Table 5 — Estimation results for sample of weekend and public holiday prescriptions, intensive
margin.
Expenses per unit Medication volume
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Onsite pharmacy 0.031 0.038∗∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.033 0.032 0.044
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.125) (0.113) (0.118)
Patient is female −0.074∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.070∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.014) (0.014)
Patient drug historya 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Patient hospital historyb 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.003) (0.003)
Patient wage 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Patient is migrant −0.045∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.009 −0.014
(0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.013)
GP adjusted mortality −0.102 −2.736
(0.378) (2.488)
GP fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year and month Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ATC codes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Patient education and age Yes Yes Yes Yes
GP age Yes Yes
Community fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 1,130,723 1,130,723 1,130,723 1,130,723 1,130,723 1,130,723
Adjusted R2 0.166 0.215 0.217 0.019 0.066 0.066
Notes: In this table we present results from estimating equation (1) on the sample of weekend and public
holiday GP consultations. Every column represents an individual regression estimated by OLS: in columns
(1), (2), and (3), the outcome is 1{expijt > 0}; in columns (4), (5), and (6), the outcome is log(1 + expijt).
Heteroskedasticity-robust and community-level clustered standard errors are given in parentheses below
coefficients; stars indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
a Medication history is the aggregate amount of drug expenses one year prior to the consultation.
b Hospital history is the aggregate number of days spent in hospital one year prior to the consultation.
yet statistically insignificant effects. Thus, it seems that GPs with onsite pharmacies are
slightly less likely to prescribe medication in the first place which leads also to a small de-
crease in overall expenses. Once medication is prescribed, we do not find any statistically
significant differences between self-dispensing and non-self-dispensing GPs.
A priori, we would expect the onsite pharmacy effect to be positive. Similar to results
from the available empirical literature, our descriptive analysis also clearly points towards
substantial excess prescription of dispensing GPs, which would be consistent with the no-
tion of physicians simply being profit-maximizing individuals who respond to financial
incentives. How can we rationalize this small negative effect? We do not necessarily
neglect the possibility that GPs are profit-maximizing individuals, yet we conjecture that
GPs may not necessarily face a strong enough incentive to overprescribe, because poten-
17
tial benefits do not exceed the cost associated with the risk of harming the patient. Keep in
mind that onsite pharmacies yield an average e 109,882.5 ($118,328.63) in revenues for
the same work other GPs earn nothing for. Thus, the additional income generated through
onsite pharmacies may allow the GPs to prescribe more defensively, along the lines of
Lucas et al. (2010). Furthermore, onsite pharmacies generally maintain a smaller variety
of drugs, and for drugs they do not have in stock, dispensing GPs have the same incentive
to induce demand as non-self-dispensing GPs. This could also explain a zero effect.
Why does the existing literature find signs of supply-inducement then? First, Kaiser
and Schmid (2016) and Burkhard et al. (2015) both assume that sorting of GPs into onsite
pharmacies is exogenous. This may cause an upwards bias to their results which we in turn
pick up with our GP fixed effects and the physician ability measure. Second, Kaiser and
Schmid (2016) and Burkhard et al. (2015) both use Swiss data where in certain cantons
all doctors are allowed to dispense drugs, whereas in Austria only country doctors are
permitted to do so. Country doctors may differ from others in their propensity to induce
demand, which could explain the diverging results. We also know that in rural areas
competition between GPs is small, and competition is typically associated with more
generous prescription behavior (Ahammer and Schober 2016, Léonard et al. 2009, Scott
and Shiell 1997). A lack of competition may explain why our observed doctors induce
lower drug expenses in general.
As discussed in section IV, we are worried that endogenous sorting between patients
and GPs may partly drive the effects estimated on the full sample of GP consultations. We
therefore turn to the sample of weekend and public holiday prescriptions (see section IV.2
for details) where matches between patients and GPs are randomized. Estimation results
can be found in Tables 4 and 5, where Table 4 considers effects at the extensive margin
while Table 5 gives effects at the intensive margin. In both tables we present three different
specifications for each outcome: in the first column we show the crude onsite pharmacy
effect only controlling for GP fixed effects, time fixed effects, and the ATC code of the
medical drug. In the second column we extend the set of covariates by patient-level
observables — in particular, gender, age, migratory status, education, health proxies, and
wages. In the third column we complete the model and also include time-varying GP level
observables (i.e., age and ability proxy) as well as community fixed effects.
On the extensive margin we still find a negative and statistically significant effect of
consulting a self-dispensing GP on drug expenses. The probability of receiving medica-
tion in the first place decreases by at least 12.3 percentage points — this is a rather large
effect, corresponding to a reduction from 54.1% to 41.8% in terms of the sample mean.
Since, conversely, the likelihood of having zero medical expenses increases by 12.3 per-
centage points, overall expenses also decrease by a large 38.9%. This amounts to a reduc-
tion from e 24.2 ($26.1) to e 14.8 ($15.9). These results suggest that the negative effect
of having an onsite pharmacy is much more pronounced outside opening hours when
the patient-GP match is random. Potentially, this could be a sign of defensive medicine
(Chandra et al. 2012, Lucas et al. 2010) if GPs encounter patients whom they do not
know, or conversely, of prescribing relatively more aggressively as soon as a relationship
between principal and agent has been built and developed.
On the intensive margin (Table 5), we find a positive effect for drug expenses per unit:
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Figure 1 — Heterogeneous effects for different patient age groups, weekend sample, extensive
margin.
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Notes: This graph depicts estimated onsite pharmacy coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from sep-
arate regressions where the sample is stratified on different patient age groups and the outcome variables
are “positive expenses” and “total expenses” (see section IV.1 for a detailed description). The underlying
sample consists of weekend and public holiday consultations.
If at least one unit of medication is prescribed, self-dispensing GPs induce 3.8% higher
expenses per unit. Again, we do not find any effect on medication volume. For patients
that are unknown to the GP, self-dispensing therefore reduces the likelihood of receiving
medication. If medication is prescribed, however, it is marginally more expensive if the
GP is self-dispensing. Since this effect is offset by the smaller probability of prescribing
in the first place, the overall effect of onsite pharmacies on drug expenses is negative.
In terms of our other covariates, coefficients largely have their expected sign. Fe-
males are more likely to receive medication, yet at lower cost. Sicker patients (indicated
through positive coefficients on the drug and hospital) receive more and relatively ex-
pensive drugs, migrants receive more but cheaper drugs, and low-ability GPs prescribe
more, ceteris paribus. Interestingly, higher wages seem to have a negative effect on the
extensive margin, which may also be a result of lower information asymmetry between
principal and agent if we expect wages to be positively correlated with ability. Note also
that our estimated onsite pharmacy coefficient is fairly stable across specifications, indi-
cating a small correlation with other patient and GP-level observables.
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Figure 2 — Heterogeneous effects for different GP age groups, weekend sample, extensive margin.
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Notes: This graph depicts estimated onsite pharmacy coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from sep-
arate regressions where the sample is stratified on different GP age groups and the outcome variables are
“positive expenses” and “total expenses” (see section IV.1 for a detailed description). The underlying sam-
ple consists of weekend and public holiday consultations.
V.1. Heterogeneous effects
In Figures 1, 2, and 3, we depict estimates of the onsite pharmacy coefficients for differ-
ent subsamples of the population. We restrict our analysis to outcomes on the extensive
margin in the weekend sample. In all estimations we use the most comprehensive specifi-
cation from columns (3) and (6) in Table 4. Figure 1 suggests that the older the patient is,
the more reluctant a GP who operates an onsite pharmacy is to prescribe medication. The
patient-age gradient is nonlinear — while the magnitude of the effect for both measures
of the extensive margin is fairly stable up to 40 years of age, the effect increases dramat-
ically for subsequent age groups, until it again stabilizes at the 70 year mark. Figure 2
depicts effect heterogeneities for different GP age groups. We find that the negative effect
on both outcomes at the extensive margin are mainly driven by mid-aged (45 to 60 years
old) GPs, while both younger and older ones do not change their prescription behavior
significantly if they have onsite pharmacies. For old GPs (above 60 years of age), we find
a small positive effect, which is statistically insignificant nonetheless. Figure 3 shows that
the onsite pharmacy effect increases with decreasing patient education, i.e., dispensing
GPs prescribe more defensively when the patient is uneducated.
Finally, Table 6 presents heterogeneous results based on patient gender and wage
(where high wage is defined as above median wage, and low wage is defined as below
median wage) as well as GP gender for all four outcomes considered before. Interest-
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Figure 3 — Heterogeneous effects for different patient education groups, weekend sample, exten-
sive margin.
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Notes: This graph depicts estimated onsite pharmacy coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from sep-
arate regressions where the sample is stratified on different patient education groups and the outcome
variables are “positive expenses” and “total expenses” (see section IV.1 for a detailed description). The
underlying sample consists of weekend and public holiday consultations.
ingly, our estimated onsite pharmacy effects seem to be driven mostly by female doctors.
For male doctors effects on the extensive margin are negative as well, yet smaller in mag-
nitude and statistically insignificant. We do, however, observe a positive and borderline
significant effect on number of units prescribed for males. In terms of patient gender we
find almost equal effects throughout, although they generally seem to be slightly stronger
for females. In terms of patient wage, effects are stronger for those earning below median.
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Table 6 — Heterogeneous effects, weekend sample.
Patient gender Patient wage GP gender
Male Female High Low Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Positive expenses −0.112∗∗∗ −0.132∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗ −0.021 −0.189∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.052) (0.024) (0.052) (0.017) (0.046)
Total expenses −0.367∗∗ −0.405∗∗ −0.290∗∗∗ −0.411∗∗ −0.015 −0.642∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.199) (0.080) (0.205) (0.044) (0.187)
Expenses per unit 0.019 0.054∗∗∗ −0.025 0.049∗∗∗ 0.039 0.030
(0.028) (0.017) (0.039) (0.019) (0.030) (0.024)
Medication volume 0.202∗ −0.086 0.211∗∗∗ −0.014 0.218∗ −0.126
(0.116) (0.160) (0.078) (0.147) (0.116) (0.160)
Notes: In this table we present results from estimating equation (1) on different subsamples of the popu-
lation, with only weekend and public holiday GP consultations considered. Every cell in the table repre-
sents an individual regression estimated by OLS. Heteroskedasticity-robust and community-level clustered
standard errors are given in parentheses below coefficients; stars indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
VI. Conclusions
Ideally, physicians are perfect agents. In reality, however, we observe striking differences
in health care provision which cannot be explained by patient health or preferences. An
important determinant of these differences are financial incentives. In this paper, we study
whether physicians who are allowed to dispense drugs themselves through onsite pharma-
cies show different prescription patterns than others. It turns out that, although they have
much larger per patient drug expenses than other GPs, we find negative to no effects once
we control for an extensive array of covariates and account for sorting of GPs into onsite
pharmacies and matching between patients and GPs.
We have several explanations for this result which contrasts the existing literature.
First, Kaiser and Schmid (2016) and Burkhard et al. (2015) both assume that sorting of
GPs into onsite pharmacies is exogenous, which potentially causes their results to be up-
wards biased. In our framework, this type of sorting should be picked up by GP fixed ef-
fects and a measure of physician ability. Second, Kaiser and Schmid (2016) and Burkhard
et al. (2015) both use Swiss data where in certain cantons all doctors are allowed to dis-
pense drugs, whereas in Austria only country doctors are permitted to do so. Country
doctors may differ from others in their propensity to induce demand, and a lack of com-
petition decreases incentives for overprescription behavior. Note, however, that we do
not necessarily neglect the possibility that GPs are profit-maximizing individuals, yet the
financial incentives to overprescribe may not be strong enough in our case if potential ben-
efits do not exceed the cost of potentially harming the patient. Onsite pharmacies yield an
average e 109,882.5 ($118,328.63) in revenues for the same work other GPs earn nothing
for. Thus, the additional income generated through onsite pharmacies may allow the GPs
to prescribe more defensively. Finally, note that GPs with onsite pharmacies generally
maintain a smaller variety of drugs, and for drugs they do not have in stock, dispensing
GPs have the same incentive to induce demand as non-self-dispensing GPs, which could
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also explain a zero effect.
The target of future research clearly should be to obtain further evidence on the rela-
tionship between onsite pharmacies and prescription behavior for other countries. Also,
our empirical setup does not allow us to look at outcomes other than drug prescriptions;
analyzing effects on non-drug services along the lines of Kaiser and Schmid (2016) would
definitely add to our understanding of onsite pharmacies.
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